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N/A [24 C.2d 774 _ PEOPLE V. SCOTT 
- _.. . ... -._ .... 
Insurance Commissioner show without . doubt that,. ac~epting 
the testimony of the witneSses concerning the representations 
said to have been made by Collins as true, he had reasonable 
grounds for believing that they were correct. Certainly those 
statements were no broader than the showing made by the 
Insurance Commissioner in his verified petition that Great 
States was in a hazardous condition ... And although, as the 
attorney general contends, a company which is insolvent or 
unable to carryon its business in accordance with'statutory 
requirements may be able to make a better reinsllranceagree-
ment, if everyone of its policyholders continues to pay pre-
miums, an agent who repeats only the charges made by the 
commissioner against a company, or fairly states the financial 
condition of an insurer upon the basis of information reason-
ably believed by, him to be true, does not violate the provi-
sions of the Insurance· Code. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Ourtis, J., Oarter, J., Traynor, J., 
and Schauer, J., concuri'ed. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Septem-
ber 18, 1944. 
[Crim. No. 4543. In Bank. Aug. 28, 1944.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. AARON SCOTT, Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law - Former Jeopardy - Identity of Offenses-
Rape.-Under Pen. Code, § 261, a single act of intercourse 
amounts to only one punishable offense of rape even though 
it be accomplished under more than one of the circumstances 
enumerated in that section. 
[2] Id.-Appeal-Modification of JUdgment.-Judgments of con-
viction on different counts charging rape will be consolidated 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 143; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 1446; [3] Criminal Law, § 1169; [4] Criminal Law, § 1268; 
[5] Indictment and Information, § 74; [6] Weapons, § 10; [7] 
Criminal Law, § 1223. 
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on appeal into a single judgment where there is hut one 
punishable offense. 
[3] Id . .....:..Appeal-Record~Transcript of Prelimiil.a1'7 Examina-
tion.-The denial of a motion to. dismiss a count of an infor-
mation on the ground that the defendant was not legally com-
., mitted by a magistrate, is not reviewable where the trans(lript 
of the prelimmary examination is' not brought up. 
[4] Id.-AplIeal-Who May Urge ErrorS-Errors Oonsentedto.-
A defendant who pleaded not gililty toa count charging viO-
lation of Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702, cannot complain on appeal 
of want of jurisdiction of the superior court on the ground 
, that the cause was instituted therein instead of the juvenile 
court, where each department of the court had beendesig. 
nated as a juvenile court, and where on hearing of the motion 
the defendant disclaimed any wish that the court convene on 
the count as a juvenile court. 
[5] Indictment and Information-Joinder-Offenses Oonnected in 
Oommission.-Different offenses may be joined, even though 
they do not relate to the same transaction or event, if there 
is a common element of substantial importance in their com-
mission. Accordingly, a charge of rape against a person who 
intimidated the victim with a firearm and a charge of tam-
pering with identification marks of a pistol may be joined, 
AS the possession of the weapon is a common and important 
element. of each crime. (Code Civ. Proc., § 954.) 
[6] Weapons-Presumptions-Alteration of. Identification Marks. 
-The Dangerous Weapons Control Act .of 1923, § 13 (Stats. 
1923, p. 702; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 1970) making posses-
sion of a firearm whose marks of identification have been 
'tampered with prima facie evidence that the tampering was 
done by the possessor, does not violate the due process clause 
of the 14th Amendment of the U. S. Const. 
[7] Criminal Law-Appeal-Briefs-Pointing Out Errors.-A re-
viewing court will not ordinarily consider questions that are 
not assigned as prejudicial error or presented in the briefs 
of counsel. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Barbara County and from an order' denying' a new trial. 
Atwell Westwick, Judge. :Modified and afllrmed. 
[5] See 14,Oa1.Jur. 64; 27 Am.Jur. 688. 
[6] Statutes making one fact presumptive evidence of another, 
see, notes, 31 A.L.R. 1222; 51 A.L.R. 1139; 86 A.L.R. 179. ,Se~, 
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Prosecution for rape, for contributing to the delinquency 
of a minor, and for violation of the Dangerous Weapons 1 Con-
trol Act. Judgment of conviction modified and affirmed., 
Fred A. Shaeffer for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, David K. Lener, Dep-
utyAttorney General, Lawrence M. Parma, District Attor-
ney, and Thomas P. Weldon, Deputy District Attorney, for 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I:n an information filed by the District At-
torney of the County of Santa Barbara, defendant was ac-
cused of rape in Counts I, II, and III, on the basis of a single 
act of int.ercourse with a sixteen-year-old girl against her 
will. Count I charged statutory rape upon a female under 
the age of consent, in violation of subdivision 1 of section 261 
of the Penal Code. Count II charged that the rape was ac-
complished by force and violence in violation of suhdivision 3 
of section 261. Count III charged that the rape was accom-
plished by threats of great bodily harm to the prosecutrix in 
violation of subdivision 4 of section 261. Count IV, based 
upon the same acts set out in Counts I, II, and III, charged 
defendant with contributing to the delinquency of a minor 
in violation of section 702. of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code. Count V charged the defendant with tampering with 
the identification marks on an automatic pistol in violation 
of section 13 of the Dangerous Weapons' Control Law of 
1923, as amended (Stats. 1923, ch. 339; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1937, Act 1970, p. 999). 
The defendant pleaded :q.ot guilty to each count. He was 
tried before a jury and convicted on all counts. Separate 
judgments were entered on each of the charges of rape in 
Counts I, II, and III sentencing defendant to the state prison 
for the term prescribed by law. The judgment on Count IV 
sentenced defendant to one' day in the county jail, and the 
judgment on Count V sentenced him to the state prison for 
the term prescribed by law. All of the sentences were to run 
concurrently. 
[1] It is unnecessary to set forth in detail the testimony 
regarding the charges of rape. There can be no doubt of 
defendant's guilt as to Count I. He admitted the act of 
Aug. 19M] PEOPLE 'V. SCOTT 
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intercourse and he admitted that complainant was not his 
wife. There was ample evidence that she was only sixteen 
years of age. As to Counts II and III the evidence establishes 
that the assault was accomplished by force and threats of 
great bodily harm to the complainant. The same evidence 
supports defendant's conviction on Count IV. The defen-
dant, however, cannot be convicted on three separate counts 
of rape, all based on a single act of intercourse. Under sec-
tion 261 of the Penal Code a single act of intercourse amounts 
to only one punishable offense of rape even though it be ac-
complished under more than one of the circumstances enu-
merated in that section. (People v. Oraig, 17 Ca1.2d 453 
[110 P.2d 403].) [2] The separate judgments on Counts 
I, II and III, must therefore be consolidated into a single 
judgment. (Ibid.) 
[3] Defendant contends that the court's adverse rulings 
on his motions to dismiss Counts II, IV and V require a re-
versal. The motion to dismiss Count II was based on the 
ground that defendant had not been legally committed by a 
magistrate. (Pen. Code, § 995 (1) .) After reading the tran-
script of the preliminary examination, the court denied the 
motion. This transcript was not brought up on appeal, and 
error cannot be assumed in its absence. 
[4] The motion to dismiss Count IV was based on the 
claim that the superior court, when not sitting as a juvenile 
court, is without jurisdiction to try a defendant accused of 
violating section 702 of the Welfare and Institutions Code 
unless the prosecution was initiated in the juvenile court and 
then transferred to the superior court sitting in the exercise 
of its general jurisdiction. The juvenile court has original 
jurisdiction over all misdemeanors defined in section 702 of 
the Welfare and Institutions Code (Inre Gamo, 122 Cal.App. 
725, 726 [10 P.2d 770]) and has jurisdiction to impose pun-
. ishment in such cases when the defendant enters a plea of 
guilty. Jurisdiction rests with the superior court if the 
defendant, as in this case, enters a plea of not guilty. (Peo-
ple v. Superior Oourt of San Bernardino Oounty, 104 Cal. 
App. 276 [285 P. 871]; In re Gamo, supra.) " It was stipu-
lated that each of the two departments of the Superior Oourt 
in the Oounty of Santa Barbara has been designated as a 
juvenile court. Under defendant's. plea of not guilty it would 
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court to be transferred back to the superior court. In any 
event, defendant cannot complain that this was not done, for 
on the hearing of defendant's motion, the court declared: 
"I am telling you specifically that if you wish it, we will 
convene on the fourth count as a juvenile court." That was 
not what the defendant wished, and the court denied the mo-
tion. 
[5] The evidence as to Count V shows that defendant had 
in his possession an automatic pistol, and that someone bad 
tampered with the identification marks in violation of the 
statute. The court instructed the jury in the language o~ 
section 13 of the Dangerous Weapons' Control Law of 1923, 
which provides: "No person shall change, alter, remove, or 
obliterate the name of the maker, model, manufacturer.'s num· 
ber, or other mark of identification on any pistol or revolver. 
Possession of any such firearm npon which the sama shall 
have been changed, altered, removed, or obliterated, shall be 
presumptive evidence that such possessor' haa Clhanged, al. 
tered, removed, or obliterated the same." 
Defendant contends that his motion to dismiss Count V 
should, have been granted on the ground that the violation 
of the Dangerous Weapons' Control Law charged therein 
and the rape charged in the other counts of the information 
could not be tried together. Section 954 of the Penal Code 
provides that "An indictment, information, or complaint 
may charge two or more different offenses connected together 
in their commission, or different statements of the same of· 
fense or two or more different offenses of the same class of 
crimes or offenses, under separate counts" and that the court 
','in the interest of justice and for good cause shown, may, 
in its discretion, order that the different offenses or counts 
set. forth in the indictment or information be tried sepa~ 
rately." The statute provided originally that an indictment 
could charge only one offense, but an amendment in 1905 
authorized a joinder of different offenses if they related to 
the same, act, transaction, or event (People v. Plath, 166 Cal.. 
227 [135 P. 954] ; see 14 Cal.Jur. 64), and an amendment in 
1915 permitted the joinder of offenses if they were "con-
nected together in their commission." As it now reads' the 
statute permits the joinder of different offenses, even though 
they do not relate. to the same transaction or event, if there 
is a common element of substantial importance in their como, 
Aug. 1944) PEOPLE V. SCOTT 
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mission, f-or the joinder prevents repetition of evidence and 
saves time and expense to the state as well as to the defendant. 
(People v. Thorn, 138 Cal.App. 714, 735 [33, P.2d 5]; see 
People v. West, 34 Cal.App.2d 55, 59 [93 P.2d 153] ; People 
v. Derenzo, 46 Cal.App.2d 411, 415 [115P.2d 858].). The 
possession of the firearm in the present case intimidated the 
complainant and was' therefore an important element of 
the rape .. It was also the basis of the offense charged under the 
Dangerous Weapons' Control Law. The possession of,. the 
weapon was thus a common and important element of each 
crime. Since the joinder did not result in embarrassment or 
prejudice to the defense (see Pointer v; United States, 151 
U.S. 396, 403 [14 S.Ct. 410, 38 L.Ed. 208] ;,Sheppard v. State, 
104 Neb. 709 [178 N.W. 616, 18 A.L.R. 1074];' 27'Am.Jur. 
Indictments and Information, § 130), it cannot be held that 
justice required, separate trial or that the ~court abused its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion. 
[6] Defendant challenges the constitutionalitY of 'tlie pro~ 
vision 'of section 13 that makes possession of a firearm whose 
'marks of identification have been tampered' with prima facie 
evidence that the tampering was done by the possessor.' He 
contends that the rational connection between a fact proved 
and the fact presumed required by the due:process clause· of 
the 14th Amendment (Tot v. United States, 319:U.S. 463,' 467 
[63 S.Ot. 1241,8.7 L.Ed. 1519] ; Morrison v. Oalifornia, 291 
U.S. 82, 90 [54 S.Ot. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664]; Western & Atlantic 
R. 00. v. Henderson, 279 U.S; 639, 642, [49' S.Ct. 445, 73 L. 
Ed. 884]; Manley v. Georgia~ 279 U.S. 1 [498.0t. 215, 73 
L.Ed. 575]; Oasey y.; United States, 276 U.S. ,413, 418 [48 
S.Ot. 373, 72 L.Ed. 632] ; Yee Hem v.' United States, 268 U.S; 
178,183 [45 S.Ot. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904] ; McFarland V. Amer~ 
can:Sugar Ref. 00.,241 U.S. 79; ,86 {36 S.Ct.498, 60 L.Eel 
899] ; Luria v; United States, 231' U.S. 9, 25' [34 S.Ot. 10,58 
L.Ed. 101] ; Lindsleyv. Natural Oarbonic 'Gas 00., 220 U.S. 
61,81 [31 S.Ot. 337, 55 L.Ed.3'OO1; BaiZey v. Alabama, 219 
U.S. '219, 238, 239 [31 S.Ct.' 145, 55 L.Ed. 191] ; 'Mobile J.& 
K: O. R: Oo.v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 [31 S.Ot. 130, 
55 L;Ed. 78]) does not exist between the fact of possession 
lind the presumption that the possessor coMmitted the crime 
of tampering with the marks. 
:; The rational connection required between a proved fact 
and a presumed' fact must be distinguished from the relation 
11 
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between a proved fact and an alleged fact that warrants a 
jury's inferring the one from the other (Tot v. United States, 
supra, at p. 468). An inference must be justified by the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. A statutory presumption, 
however, designed for general application in a given field 
and based on a pattern of experience in that field, is justified 
by the likelihood that the unpredictable circumstances of 
other cases will fall within the same pattern. The presump-
tion may be invoked if the proved fact is "at least a warning 
signal according to the teachings of experience" (Morrison 
v. California, supra, at p. 90) of the fact presumed, and "the 
evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister signifi-
cance." (Ibid. p. 90.) The due process clause, however, 
forbids the introduction into the law of a fiction under the 
cloak of a presumption that would contradict the presumption 
of innocence and work a "wrong contrary to the real truth 
and substance of the thing" (Hibberd v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547, 
561 [4 P. 473, 8 P. 46, 56 Am.St.Rep. 726]) by imposing on 
the accused a burden that "is not justified in the light of 
experience as to the circumstances of life as we know them" 
(Tot v. United States, supra, at p. 468). Thus, a presump-
tion of an intent to defraud based on breach of contr'lct of 
employment by an employee who has received an advance 
payment is a mere fiction and therefore unconstitutional. 
(Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 [31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed. 
191]; see Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 [64 S.Ct. 792, 
88 L.Ed. --].) It is likewise a fiction that the possession 
of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of 
violence or by a fugitive from justice is prima facie evidence 
of shipping, transporting, or receiving in interstate commerce 
of such firearm by the accused after the date of enactment 
of the statute. (Tot v. United States, supra.) It may be a 
plausible supposition that the possessor of a firearm might use 
it for a crime of violence but there can be no "argument 
drawn from experience" (Tot v. United States, supra, at 
p. 468) to justify the presumption that such a firearm was 
acquired in interstate commerce. The presumption in the 
California statute differs from that declared unconstitutional 
in the Tot case. It applies to any possessor of a firearm with 
impaired marks of identification, whereas the presumption 
in the Tot case applied only to a certain group of possessors 
of firearms, whose members were no more likely to acquire 
Aug. 1944] PEOPLE v. SCOT'!' 
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firearms in interstate commerce than others. ,Most important, 
the presumption in the California act that the possessor of a 
weapon whose marks of identification have been tampered 
with committed the crime of tampering with them is based 
on the condition that there be proof of tampering with the 
marks of identification on the firearm and is therefore con-
cerned only with the identification of the person who com-
mitted the crime. The statute in the Tot case made posses-
sion of a firearm the basis of the presumption not only that 
the possessor was the person who committed the crime, but 
that the crime was committed even though there was nothing 
suspicious about the firearm to indicate that the crime had 
been committed. Presumptions like that in the California 
statute, based on the possession of a sinister thing, are tradi-
tional in criminal legislation, which frequently imposes on 
the possessor of contraband goods the burden of explaining 
that he did not acquire or use them unIawfully. Thus the 
possession of burglary tools by anyone except artisans and 
tradesmen at their places of business (State v. Fitzpatrick, 
141 Wash. 638 [251 P. 875]), or the possession by junk-deal-
ers of certain bottles with trade-marks or with trade-marks 
obliterated (People v. Cannon, 139 N.Y. 32 [34 N.E. 759, 36 
Am.St.Rep. 668]), can be made prima facie evidence of their 
unlawful acquisition or of the intent of the possessor to. use 
them unlawfully, just as the possession of articles, the sale 
of which is forbidden, may be made prima facie evidence of 
the keeping for sale of such articles. (State v. Nossaman, 
107 Kan. 715 [193 P. 347, 20 A.L.R. 921] ; State v. Barrett, 
138 N.C. 630 [50 S.E. 506, 1 L.R.A.N.S. 626] ; Caffee v. State, 
11 Okla. Cr. 485 [148 P. 680]; see 33 Words and Phrases, 
Prima Facie Evidence, Criminal Law; 28 Columb.L.Rev. 
489.) Possession of intoxicating liquor and narcotics par-
ticularly has served to impose on the possessor the burden 
of explaining the lawfulness of their acquisition and use. 
(Casey v. United States, supraj Yee Hem v. United States, 
supraj United States v. Yee Fing, 222 F. 154; United States 
v. Ah Hung, 243 F. 762; see 9 Wigmore, Evidence [1940] 
§ 2513, pp. 423 and 424 and cases there cited; 31 A.L.R. 1222; 
51 A.L.R. 1139; 86 A.L.R. 179.) In all such cases the posses-
sion of an article that has been or is likely to be made an 
'instrument of crime raises a suspicion that justifies calling 
Ii 
!i 
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on the accused for explanation. (Casey v. United States, 
supra, at p. 418; People v. Fitzgerald, 14 Oal.App.2d 180, 
194, 195 [58 P.2d 718].) In the light of these cases the pre-
sumption in the present case is not "such a forced arid un-
natural one that the legislature may not enact that it shall 
be made." (People v. Cannon, 139 N.Y. 32, 46 [34 N.E. 759, 
763, 36 Am.St.Rep. 668].) 
The Dangerous Weapons Control Act is designed to mini-
mize the dang-<1r to public safety arising from the free access 
to firearms that can be used for crimes of violence. The iden-
tification of a person who has used a firearm crimh1ally be. 
comes more difficult and the attractiveness of a firearm for 
criminals is correspondingly increased, if its marks of iden-
tification have been tampered with. It would therefore be in 
the public interest, to forbid the possession of firearms whose 
marks of identification have been tampered with. The mere 
threat of conviction to the possessor of such a firearm engen-
dered by the presumption that he did the tampering is less 
severe than a statutory prescription of punishment for pos-
session of such a firearm. The imposition of punishment for 
the possession of such a weapon is within the power of the 
Legislature to regulate the traffic in firearms. Legislation 
for regulatory purposes, which dispenses with the condition 
of awareness of wrongdoing and places the burden of acting 
at his peril on a person otherwise innocent "but standing 
in personal relation to a public danger" (United States v. 
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 [64 S.Ot. 134, 88 L.Ed. 
--1 ; see Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 
69, 'fO [30 S.Ot. 663, 54 L.Ed. 930] ; United States v. Balint, 
258 U.S. 250, 252 [42 S.Ot. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604]) is a tradi-
tional means of regulation. The protection of the public 
interest in eliminating firearms whose marks of identification 
have been tampered with by a statute that resorts to the 
less severe means of regulation by using the "inherent co-
ercive power of a presumption" (Pollock v. Williams, supra, 
64 S.Ot. 792, 802) is likewise within the police power of the 
state. (See In re Bear, 216 Cal. 536. 540 [15 P.2d' 489, 83 
A.L.R. 1402] ; Amos Bird Co. v. Thompson, 274 F. 702, 705.) 
The tampering with marks of identification is ordinarily done 
in secrecy, and if the state could not require the possessor 
of the firearm to explain his possession. it would hardly be 
possible for the prosecution to determine who committed the 
Aug. 1944] PEOPLE v. SCOTT 
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crime. There is nothing unreasonable in requiring the pos-
sessor to explain when and how he came into possession of a 
firearm whose marks of identification have been tampered 
with. The presumption does not impose on him the burden of 
proving who committed the crime, nor does it require him 
to persuade the jury of his innocence. ' He must merely go 
forward 'With evidence to the extent of raising a reasonable 
doubt that he tampered with the identification marks. When 
he has done so, he enjoys the benefit of the presumption of 
irinocence, and it is then incumbent on the prosecution to 
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. 
Fitzgerald, supra, at p. 195; People v. Agnew, 16 Cal.2d 655, 
665 [107 P.2d 601] ; People v. Post, 208 Cal. 433. 437 [281 P; 
618] ; People v. Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, 164 [22 P. 127, 549].) 
[7] Defendant objects to the instruction with respect to 
the statutory presumption solely on the ground that the stat-
ute is unconstitutional. He does not contend that the instruc-
tions are otherwise erroneous or that the verdict would prob-
ably have been different had other instructions been given. 
Since the statute is constitutional, further inquiry as to 
possible' error is unnecessary, for the court will not ordinarily 
consider questions that are not assigned as prejudiciill error 
or presented in the briefs of counsel. (People v. French, 12 
Cal.2d 720, 764 [87 P.2d 1014] ; People v. Wier, 20 Cal.App. 
2d 91, 94 [66 P.2d 703]; People v.Oowan, 4~ Cal.App.2d 
155, 158 [112 P.2d 62]; People v. Britton, 6 Cal.2d 10. 13 
[56 P.2d 491].) Even if it be assumed, however, that the 
trial court's instruction should have been more specific in 
certain particulars, for example, that it should have in-
structed the jury that defendant was required only to raise 
, a reasonable doubt that he did the tampering, it is improb-
able that the result would have been different. (People v. 
, Rog~rs, 22 Ca1.2d 787 [141 P.2d 722] ; Cal. Const., art. VI, 
. § 41h.) 'Defendant. was admittedly inconsistent in explaining 
.' thesoul'ce from which he obtained the firearm, and the ex-
planation that he finally adhered to at the trial was clearly 
• contradicted' by other evidence. 
·The judgment as to Counts I, II and III is consolidated 
and modified to read "whereas the said Aaron Scott has been 
. found guilty of the crime of rape, a felony, as defined and 
prescribed in sub-divisions 1, 3, and 4 of section 261 of the 
784 PEOPLE V. SCOTT [240.2d 
Penal Code being separate statements of the same offense, it 
is therefore ordered, adjudged aud decreed that the said 
Aaron Scott be punished by imprisonment in the state prison 
of the State of California at San Quentin for the term pre-
scribed by law." As so modified the judgment and the order 
denying a new trial are affirmed. The judgment and the 
ordor denying a new trial as to Count IV are affirmed. The 
judgment and the order denying a new trial as to Count V 
are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent from that portion of the majority 
opinion which holds constitutional that portion of the pro-
vision of section 13 of the Dangerous Weapons' Control Act 
of 1923, which makes possession of a firearm whose marks of 
identification have been tampered with presumptive evidence 
that the tampering was done by the possessor. In my opinion 
this provision clearly violates the due process clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States and is therefore invalid and void. 
The majority opinion states: "The tampel'ing with marks 
of identification is ordinarily done in secrecy, and if the state 
could not require the possessor of the firearm to explain his 
possession, it would hardly be possible for th~ prosecution 
to determine who committed the crime. There is nothing un-
reasonable in requiring the possessor to explain when and 
how he came into possession of a firearm whose marks of iden-
tification have been tampered with. The presumption does 
not impose on him the burden of proving who committed the 
crime, nor does it require him to persuade the jury of his 
innocence. He must merely go forward with evidence to the 
extent of raising a reasonable doubt that he tampered with 
the identification marks. When he has done so, he enjoys 
the benefit of the presumption of innocence, and it is then 
incumbent on the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
In my opinion the foregoing reasoning is unrealistic and 
unsound. To my mind it is perfectly obvious that the pre-
sumption of guilt provided for in said section 13 deprives the 
defendant of the presumption of innocence which is accorded 
every defendant under the Constitution and laws of this 
state, and to say that the presumption provided for in said 
Aug. 1944] PEOPLE V. SCOTT 
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section "does not require him (the defendant) to persUade 
the jury of his innocence," is specious reasoning and wholly 
unrealistic. It is obvious that under this section and under 
the instruction given to the jury in the case at oar a defen': 
dant could be found guilty of a violation of this section re:-
gardless of the explanation he gives concerning the change of 
any marks of identification on a pistol or revolver in his 
possession. In. other words, the statutory presumption would 
constitute sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty 
everi though the defendant offered positive and convincing 
evidence that he had nothing to do with the making of sueli 
alteration. Furthermore, there is no sound basis in fact for 
the creation of such a presumption upon mere proof of pos~ 
session of the weapon. .., 
In the case of Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 [63 S.Ct. 
1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519], the defendant was convicted under the· 
Federal Firearms Act (52 Stat. at L. 1250, 1251, 15 U.S.C: 
§ 902f), which makes it unlawful for anyone who has been 
convicted of a crime of violence to receive any firearm or 
ammunition that has been transported in interstate commerce. 
It provides that "the possession of a firearm or ammunition 
by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such 
firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or re-
ceived, as the case mny be, by such person in violation of this 
Act. " The government proved that Tot had been convicted 
of a crime of violence and that he was found in possession 
of a loaded automatic pistol. The defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict was denied and he was convicted. The con-
viction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court on 
the ground that the provision for thc presumption was un-
constitutional since there was "no rational connection be-
tween the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed." 
With regard to the government's contention that the statute 
met the established tests of due process, the court declal~d: 
"But the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments set limits upon the power of Congress or that 
of a state legislature to make the proof of one fact or group 
of facts evidence of the existence of the ultimate fact on 
which guilt is predicated ...• The Government seems to argue 
that there are two alternative tests of the validity of a 
presumption created by statute. 'The first is that there be 
a rational connection between the facts proved and the fact 
. 
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presumed j the second that of comparative convenience of 
producing evidence of the ultimate fact. We are of the opin-
ion that these are not independent tests but that the first is 
. controlling and the second but a corollary. Under our deci-
sions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there 
be no rational connection between the fact proved and the 
ultimate fact presumed, if the . inference of the one from 
proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection 
between the two in common experience. This is not to say 
that a valid presumption may not be created upon a view 
of relation broader than that a jury might take in a speCIfic 
case. But where the inference is so strained as not to have 
a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know 
them it is not competent for the legislature to create it as a 
rule governing the procedure of courts .... It is not too much 
to say that the presumptions created by the law are violent, 
and inconsistent with any argument drawn from experience. 
"Nor can the fact that the defendant has the better means 
of information, standing alone, justify the .creation of such 
a presumption.. In every criminal case the defendant has at 
least an equal familiarity with the facts and in most a greater 
familiarity with them than the prosecution. It might, there-
fore, be argued that to place upon all defendants in criminal 
cases the burden of going forward with the evidence would 
be proper. But the argument proves too much. If it were 
sound, the legislature might validly command that the find-
ing of an indictment, or mere proof of the identity of the 
accused should create a presumption of the existence of aU 
the facts essential to guilt. This is not permissible. 
"Whether the statute in question be treated as expressing 
the normal balance of probability, or as laying down a rule 
of comparative ()onvenience in the production of evidence, 
it leaves the jury free to act on the presumption alone once 
the specified facts are proved, unless the defendant comes 
forward with opposing evidence. And this we think enou,gh 
to vitiate the statutory provision. 
"Doubtless the defendants in these cases knew better than 
anyone else whether they acquired the firearms or ammuni-
tion in interstate commerce~ . It would, therefore, be a con-
venience to the Government to rely upon the presumption and 
cast on the defendants the burden of coming forward with 
Ang.1944] PEOPLE V. SCOTT 
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evidence to rebut it. But, as we have shown, it is not permis-
sible thus to shift the burden by arbitrarily making one fact, 
'which has no relevance to guilt of the offense, the occasion 
of casting on the defendant the obligation of exculpation • 
The' argument from convenience is admissible only where the 
inference is a permissible one, where the defendant has more 
convenient access to the proof, and where requiring him to go 
'forward with proof will not subject him to unfairness or hard-
ship .... " 
The Tot case compels a reversal of the judgment and order 
denying anew trial on Count V. The test of due process 
laid down therein is as applicable in determining the validity 
of state legislation under t:\l,e Fourteenth Amendment as in 
determining the validity of federal legislation under the 
Fifth. There is a striking similarity between the provisions 
of the Federal Firearms Act invalidated in the Tot case and 
the provision of the California act in question here. Posses-
.sion of a firearm is presumptive evidence under the federal 
act that the possessor received it in interstate commerce and 
under the state act, that any tampering with the identifica-
tion marks was done by the possessor. It is just as arbitrary 
to infer from possession that the possessor tampered with the 
identification marks as that he. received the firearm in inter-
state commerce. The necessity of· punishing persons who 
tamper with the identification marks on firearms cannot jus-
. tHy convictions by unconstitutional devices designed to make 
P,foof of the elements of the offense unnecessary. 
:"Th'evarious circumstances under which the Supreme Court 
of the United States has held presumptions invalid clearly 
.establish that the presumption in the statute here involved 
cannot stand. All of those cases are cited with approval in 
Totv. United States, supra. In Bailey "9:. Alabama, 219 U.S. 
219. [31 S.Ct. 145, 55, L.Ed. 1.91], it was made 8 crime for an 
. employee, with intent to comm~t frau~ on his employer, to 
cnter into a .contract to perform ser:vicesand obtain money 
,thereunder and refuse to refund it or perform the services. 
From the failure to refund .. the money or perform the ser-
·.vices a presumption of. intent· to defraud was declared to 
. arise. . Mr;Farland v. American Sugar Ref. 00., 241 U.S. 79 
[36 S.Ot. 498,. 60 L.Ed. 899], involved a statute making it 
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laess. It was presumed that a monopoly existed if the per-
son systematically paid a less price for sugar in Louisiana 
than he did in other states. The statute in Manley v. Georgia, 
279 U.S. 1 [49 S.Ot. 215, 73 L.Ed. 575], denounced as a 
crime the fraudulent insolvency of a bank and declared the 
presumption that a bank which became insolvent was deemed 
to have become so fraudulently. Western & Atlantic R. 00. 
v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 [49 S.Ot. 445, 73 L.Ed. 884], 
dealt with a state statute which declared a presumption of 
negligence on the part of a railroad company when a colli-
sion occurred at a highway crossing between a train and a 
vehicle. Morrison v. Oalifornia, 291 U.S. 82 [54 S.Ot. 281, 
78 L.Ed. 664], involved the prohibition of the occupation 
of lands by aliens, and that the state need only prove that 
the defendant possessed the land and allege in the indictment 
or information that he was an alien or ineligible for naturali-
zation. The defendant must prove his citizenship. The 
court said at page 90: 
"Possession of agricultural land by one not shown to be 
ineligible for citizenship is an act that earries with it not even 
a hint of criminality. To prove such possession without more 
is to take hardly a step forward in support or an indictment. 
No such probability of wrongdoing grows out of the naked 
fact of use or occupation as to awaken a belief that the user 
or occupier is guilty if he fails to come forward with excuse 
or explanation. . . . Enn so, the occasions that justify regu-
lations of the one order have a kinship, if nothing more, to 
those that justify the others. For a transfer of the burden, 
experience must teach that the evidence held to be inculpatory 
has at least a sinister,significance. . . . 
, 'We turn to this statute and endeavor to assign it to its 
cla.~s. In the law of California there is no general prohibi-
tion of the use of agricultural lands by aliens, with special 
or limited provisos or exceptions. To the contrary, it is the 
privilege that is general, and only the prohibition that is 
limited aud special. Without preliminary proof of race, oc. 
cupation of the land is not even a suspicious circumstance." 
This case was first appealed to the District Court of Appea,l, 
Second Appellant District, Division 1, and decided by that 
tourt. 'rhe opinion rendered by that court was prepared 
by Honorable Thoml1s P. White and concurred in by Justice 
William Doran and PreHiding Jru;tice John York. I am in 
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full accord with the views expressed in said opinion and con-
sider it a clear and correct statement of the law applicable 
to the legal proposition here involved and I adopt as a portion 
of this opinion the discussion contained therein relative to 
the validity of section 13 of the Dangerous Weapons' Control 
Act of 1923, which is as follows: 
"Finally, appellant challenges the constitutionality of cer'" 
tain provisions of section 13 of the aforesaid Dangerous 
Weapons' Control Act of 1923, as amended, which formed 
the gravamen of Count V. 
"Section 13 of the act reads as follows: ' No person shall 
change, alter, remove, or obliterate the name of the maker, 
model, manufacturer's number, or other mark of identifica-
tion on any pistol or revolver. Possession of any such firearm 
upon which the same shall have been changed, altered, re-
moved, or obliterated, shall be presumptive evidence that such 
possessor has changed, altered, removed, or obliterated the 
same.' (Italics added.) 
"Pursuant to the aforesaid provisions the court instructed 
the jury that if they found from the evidence that the de-
fendant was in possession of a firearm upon which the enu-
merated marks of identification were altered, removed or 
obliterated, such possession would constitute presumptive evi-
dence that the defendant had so changed, altered, removed 
or obliterated such identifying marks. 
"The constitutionality of that portion of the section which 
makes possession of a firearm upon which marks of identifi-
cation have been tampered with, presumptive evidence that 
such possessor so changed or altered the identifying marks, 
is challenged by appellant upon the ground that being an 
essential element of the offense charged . . . a part of the 
corpus delicti . . . the fact that the defendant made the 
changes or alterations on the firearm must be proved by the 
prosecution, and that the burden of such proof cannot be 
shifted to the defendant by force of a legislative declaration 
that because of his possession of the firearm the defendant 
is presumptively guilty of the crime of making alterations 
or changes thereon. 
"The vice of the challenged portion of the statute, as we 
view it, lies in the fact that it leaves the jury free to act upon 
the presumption alone, once the specified fact of possession 
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evidence. Under the American philosophy of jurisprudence 
and constitutional guaranties, is this not enough of itself to 
vitiate the statutory provision? 
"It is here sought to sustain the validity of the questioned 
provisions of the statute upon the rule or principle of' ab 
inconvenienti. ' This principle, it is true, has been consis-
tently followed in this state in cases involving prosecutions 
for practising medicine and other professions without a li-
cense; selling intoxicating liquors without being licensed' 
so to do; illegal possession and transportation of intoxicating 
liquors, and in cases involving the question of citizenship or 
alienage. But in all these cases it is emphasized that the 
rule of convenience is applied only where the defendant has 
more convenient access to the proof, and where requiring 
him to go forward with such proof will not subject him to 
unfairness or hardship. In prosecutions for the doing of an 
act restricted to those who are licensed therefor, the rule of 
convenience is applicable because the accused, if licensed, can 
immediately show it without the least inconvenience (People 
v. Boo Doo Hong, 122 Cal. 606, 607 [55 P. 402]). Where a 
statute made it an offense knowingly to conceal smoking 
opium illegally imported and threw upon a defendant found 
in possession of such opium the burden of showing that he 
had not acquired it through illegal importation, the presump-
tion was sustained on the ground that no lawful purchase 
of smoking opium could occur in this country, and therefore, 
the possession alone gave rise to sinister implications (Y ee 
Hem v. U. S., 268 U.S. 178, ,45 S.Ot. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904). 
Where an act of Congress placed upon an alien in deportation 
proceedings the burden of proving his residence and of excus-
ing his failure to procure a certificate of residence from the 
Collector of Internal Revenue, it was held that in such a 
situation the shifting to the alien of the burden of explana-
tion imposed no unreasonable hardship upon him (Fang Yue 
Ting v. U. S., 149 U.S. 698, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905). 
But, as pointed out in Tot v. U. S. [319 U.S. 463], 63 S.Ot. 1241 
[87 L.Ed. 1519], the fact that the defendant has the better 
means of information cannot, standing alone, justify the crea-
tion of such a presumption, for the defendant in every criminal 
case possesses at least an equal familiarity with the true facts, 
and in most cases, a greater familiarity with them than does 
the prosecution. Does that fact, however, justify' the asser-
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tion under our law, that all defendants in criminal cases 
should assume the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence? If such an argument is sound and be carried to its 
logical conclusion, then why could not the Legislature val· 
idly command that the finding of an indictment, the holding 
of a defendant to answer by a committing magistrate, or even 
mere proof of the identity of the accused, should be presump-
tive evidence of the existence of all the facts essential to 
guilt? 
"Undoubtedly the defendant in the instant case knew bet-
ter than anyone else whether he himself altered the identifi-
cation marks on the firearm in question. True, it would be 
a convenience for the prosecution to rely upon the presump-
tion and cast upon the defendant the burden of producing 
evidence to rebut it. But the burden cannot thusbe lawfully 
shifted when the fact of possession is not relevant to guilt 
of the offense of altering certain identifying marks upon 
the weapon. If the offense charged was possession of the 
pistol without a permit, the situation would be quite different 
and the presumption would be legal because neither incon-
venience nor hardship would be worked upon the defendant 
in requiring him to produce such a permit, while to require 
the prosecution to negative s,uch possession of a permit would 
require endless search of records, files and documents. 
"Many people might acquire a firearm in good faith, and 
unacquainted with where marks or identification are placed 
upon the weapon, not even look for them. Yet such innocent 
possession, under the wording of section 13 of the act creates 
a presumption that such possessor is guilty of a felony and 
requires him to do what might be well nigh impossible . . . 
that is, produce evidence as 'to who did make the alterations. 
"Respondent relies upon the case of People v. Osaki, 209 
Cal. 169 [286 P. 1025], in which case proof of alienage of 
the defendants was in issue in connection with the Alien 
Land Law, forbidding ownership of land by Japanese aliens. 
In the cited case the court upheld the presumption of alien-
age under section 1983 of the Code of Civil Proc~dure. But, 
as in the medical and other license cases, no hardship was 
worked upon the defendants in requiring them to produce 
,proof of their citizenship, for such fact was peculiarly within 
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alienage would be well nigh impossible. We think it may 
fairly be stated that the principle of 'ab inconvenienti', which 
is an exception to the general rule applicable to criminal 
prosecutions, has, in this state, been confined to the particu-
lar line of cases where it becomes necessary, in order to con-
stitute the offense charged, for the prosecution to prove the 
non-existence of a license required by law or of a certificate 
of citizenship. In such cases it is easy for the defendant to 
meet the burden thus placed upon him. However, the rule 
should not be applied in the enforcement of law so as to 
relieve the prosecution of the imperative duty to establish 
the truth of the charge made against the accused. Any re-
laxation of the general rule in that regard should be strictly 
confined to the principle of the rule of convenience. In the 
instant case it is at once apparent to us that the gravamen 
of the offense denounced by section 13 of the act is not the 
possession of a firearm, but the alteration, chan6ring, removal 
or obliteration of certain identification marks thereon. Mani-
festly, if the proof of ,the prosecution under section 13 were 
to stop with a showing that the accused was in possession of 
the firearm, not even the corpus c.elicti of the charged offense 
would be proven. In addition thereto, the prosecution must 
prove that such possessor altered the identification marks on 
the weapon. Indeed, such proof is vital to establish the cor-
pus delicti of the offense charged. In our opinion, under 
such circumstances, the corpus delicti ean no more be estab-
lished with the aid of a presumption of defendant's guilt 
because of his possession than it could be shown by the extra-
'judicial statements or admissions of the accused (People v. 
Quarez, 196 Cal. 404 [238 P. 363]). The rule of cab incon-
'venienti' is not, therefore, applicable herein. 
"The rule of comparative convenience of producing evi-
dence of the ultimate fact is, in our opinion, but a corollary 
to. the main and controlling test of the validity of a presump-
tion created by statute, viz., the essential requirement that 
there shall be some rational connection between the fact 
proved and the ultimate fact presumed (Tot v. U. S., [319 
·U.S. 463] 63 S.Ot. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519]), and that the infer-
ence of one fact from proof of another shall not be so un-
. reasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate (McParland 
v. American Sugar Refining 00., 241 U.S. 79 [36 S.Ct. 498, 
60L.Ed. 899]). The essence of this requirement is tersely 
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illustrated in the language used in Brightman v. U. S., 7 F. 
2d 532, 534, involving a prosecution under the Harrison 
Anti-Narcotic Act, and wherein the court said: 'there is in 
our jUdgment no such rational connection between the fact 
of the possession of morphine in the Western District of 
Oklahoma and the fact of a purchase of it in that same dis-
trict as to make the former prima facie evidence of the latter. 
Common experience does not support such a presumption.' 
So in the case with which we are here concerned,' we are un-
able to perceive any reasonable connection or rational rela-
tionship between the fact proved, viz., possession of. the 
weapon, and the ultimate fact to be presumed, i. e., alteration 
of identifying marks thereon. The relationship, if any, is 
strained, remote and not justified in the light of commo~ expe-
rience. Section 13 of the statute herein shifts the burden of 
proof, and in a criminal case deprives the' defendant of the 
protection of his constitutional guaranties. Running through 
all of the numerous authorities we have read on the subject, 
there is to be found a concession that such a statutory rule o.f 
evidence is a dangerous one, and should not be applied where 
it has no intrinsic evidential force, or where its application 
will impair some positive statutory or 'constitutional right. In 
the case of In re Wong Hane, 108 Cal. 680, 682 [41 P. 693, 
49 Am.St.Rep. 138], the Supreme Court had before it an ordi-
nance of the city of Los Angeles, the effect of which was to 
make proof of the mere possession of a lottery ticket a mis-
demeanor, and to place upon the defendant the burden of 
showing that his possession was lawful or innocent. til de-
claring the ordinance void as unconstitutional the court said: 
'If there are any circumstances under which the possession 
of a lottery ticket may be lawful or' innocent,' a defendant 
who is charged with the offense ofhavirig snch ticket in his 
possession is entitled to the presumption of innocence, and 
cannot be compelled to establish his innocence by affirmative 
proof. To the extent that the defendant is required to estab-
lish . his innocence, the provisions of the ordinance violate his 
constitutional rights'. In citing with approval the case just 
mentioned, Mr. Justice Preston, in a well reasoned and care-
fully considered dissenting opinion in People v. Troche, 206 
Cal. 35, 61 [273 P. 767], sets forth the broad and historic 
background of the doctrine of presumption of innocence in 
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dissertation upon this presumption, but it may be well re-
membered that its object is to protect the innocent and not 
'to shield the guilty. It is a presumption of both law and fact. 
It was present in the Roman law and some authorities state 
that it marks back through Sparta and Athens to the Book of 
Deuteronomy; It was known to be a part of the common law 
as early as 1802. In 1817 Lord Gillies, in McKinley's Case 
(33 St.Tr., 275,506), in speaking of this presumption said, 
among other things: "It is a maxim which ought to be in-
scribed in indelible characters in the heart of every judge and 
juryman; and I was happy to hear from Lord Hermand he 
is inclined to give full effect to it. To overturn this· there 
must be legal evidence of guilt, carrying home a degree of 
conviction short only of absolute certainty." , 
"'Blackstone maintained (1753-1765) that: "the law holds 
that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one 
innocent suffer." (4 Bl. Com., chap. 27, margin page 358, 
ad finem.) ' 
" 'It is the strongest presumption known to the law. It is 
as much a part of our constitution, both state and national, 
as if it were written therein in letters of burnished gold. This 
fact has been assumed many times in this state and in one 
case at least expressly stated (In re W ony Hane, 108 Cal. 680 
(49 Am.St.Rep. 138,41 P. 693». We presume that no one 
would contend that this presumption could be overthrown by 
'any statutory enactment. Prima facie evidence or presump-
tions may be declared to exist where they flow logically from 
certain facts, but the presumption of innocence is ever present 
even in the deliberations of the jury and may alone and of 
itself sometimes avail to acquit the defen,dant.' 
, '" This court should be quick and decisive in its action to 
declare anew our bill of rights and to preserve the essential 
attributes of a jury trial as known to the common law and 
as preserved by our constitution (art. I, secs. 7 and 13, 
Const.). ' 
"The claim that application of the presumption in the in-
stant case resulted in doing justice to the particular defen-
dant at the bar, does not justify its application, for while a 
departure from those long established, sound, legal principles 
and constitutional guaranties may result in justice for a par-
ticular defendant, it is dangerous to the community, and in 
the final analysis, serves only to pave the way for conviction of 
the innocent. 
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"Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first 
footing by silent approaches and slight deviations from est!!b~ 
lished legal modes of procedure. In a strong dissenting,opipfon 
delivered by Mr. JustiCe Sutherland of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Associated Press v. NationaZ Labor Bela:-
tions Board, 301 U.S. 103, 142, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953, 
we are counselled to 'withstand all beginnings of encroach-
ment. For the saddest epitaph which can he carved in memory 
of a vanished liberty is that it was lost because its possessors 
failed to stretch forth a saving hand while yet there was titne. ' 
The acquittal of a guilty person is truly a miscarriage of jus-
tice, . but the conviction of an innocent person through relax-
ation of. those fundamental legal principles such as the con-
stitutiori.al 'due process of law' provision, the presumption 
'that a person is innocent of crime or wrori.g' (Code of Ciy. 
Proc., § 1963, subd. 1), would be a tragedy. It is the duty 
of the courts to be watchful of the constitutional and inalien-
able individual rights of the citizens and to halt any stealthy 
encroachments thereon. . 
"We here quote the powerful and significant language of 
the late Mr. Presiding Justice Houser of this court in the case 
of People V. Bullock, 123 Cal.App. 299, 305 [11 P.2d 441], 
wherein he said: 'I reluctantly concur in the judgment. My 
consent to the affirmance of the judgment has resulted solely 
from the compelling force of the precedents as established 
by the cases to which, in the opinion of my associate, atten-
tion has been. directed. It is clear. that the constitutional guar-
anty of "due process of law" is in great danger of being set 
a,~ naug:jlt. With but slight extension of the rule,either as 
promulgated by the statute, or as judicially announced pre~ 
ceding its enactment, in any criminal prosecution in which 
the district attorney may find it difficult to produce evidence 
of the guilt of the defendant, he may invoke the doctrine of 
"ab inconvenienti"· and thus shift to the defendant the entire 
burden of establishing his innocence. The formerly time-hon-
ored, but not-greatly respected, rule of law which requires 
the prosecution to prove beyond a' reasonable doubt every 
essential element of the crime of the commission of which the 
defendant is charged, would appear to have been given a con-
struction which would seem to be wholly at variance with the 
plain language of the ordinary rule and completely out. of 
harmony with ancient judicial precedents. It is hut a short 
(' 
, 
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step backward to a former procedure which permitted prose-
cution on mere hearsay information, and on which, in the ab-
sence of the most positive affirmative proof of innocence, the 
accusation itself was sufficient to sustain a judgment of con-
viction. To my mind, the trend of judicial utterance is too 
much toward the abrogation of many of those constitutional 
principles which affect human rights and which were most 
dearly obtained. With the destruction of the doctrine of 
"burden of proof on the prosecution," no innocent man will 
be safe; but personal liberty will again become a prized, if 
not an uncommon, condition or attribute to the citizens of the 
republic.' 
"We therefore conclude that the portion of section 13 of 
the aforesaid act which provides that' possession of any such 
firearm upon which the same shall have been changed, altered, 
removed or obliterated, shall be presumptive evidence that 
such possessor has changed, altered, removed, or obliterated 
the same' is unconstitutional and void; that therefore the 
giving to the jury of the instruction embodying such presump-
tion constituted prejudicial error and invaded the substan-
tial rights of the defendant." 
In my opinion the judgment of conviction against the de-
fendant under Count 5 of the information should be reversed. 
[L. A. No. 18573. In Bank. Aug. 31, 1944.] 
R. BERNARD DICKEY, Respondent, v. RAISIN PRORA-
TION ZONE NO. 1 et al., Appellants. 
[la-lc] Agriculture-Proration-Pledge of Surplus.-Under the 
Agricultural Prorate Act, the program committee of a prorate 
zone has implied authority to pledge to the Commodity Credit 
Corporation surplus raisins placed in a stabilization pool as 
security for loans to cover expenses in the handling and stor-
age of pooled raisins, and as additional collateral for non-
recourse loans on the balance of the crop made available to 
all producers desiring such financial assistance. (Stats. 1933, 
p. 1969, § 19.1; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 143a.) 
McK. Dig. References: [1,3,7] Agriculture, § 4; [2] Statutes, 
§.114; [4] Statutes, § 136; [5] Public Officers, § 42; [6] Statutes, 
§138. 
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Statutes - Construction - Legislative Intent.-'-Statutes are 
construed according to the intention, or at least according 
to the apparent or evident intention or purpose, of the legis-
lature. 
Agriculture-Proration-Purpose.-The Agricultural Prorafu 
Act, § 19.1, does not set up a formal trust with the contribu-
tors as such the sole beneficiaries, but it envisages a program 
by state agencies acting not primarily for individual contrib. 
utors but in the interest of the public welfare. 
Statutes - Construction-Implications.-Where the Legisla-
ture has clearly set forth the purpose of an act and enacted 
• a ground plan or design for its accomplishment, the imple-
mental portions of the act must be construed so as to achieve 
its object. 
Public Officers-Powers-Implied Powers.-Governmental of-
ficials may exercise such additional powers as are necessary 
for the due and efficient administration of powers expressly 
granted, or as may fairly be implied from the statute granting 
the powers. 
Statutes-Construction-Expressio UniuB Rule.-The maxim 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius and other rules of statu-
tory construction have no application where the effect is to 
nullify the essence of a statute by subordinating its purpose 
to a supposed limitation of its implemental terms. Such rules 
will not be utilized to contradict or vary a clear expression of 
legislative intent in a matter of vital concern to the state. 
Agriculture - Proration - Construction. - The Agricultural 
Prorate Act is to be construed so as to render it reasonable, 
fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and to avoid 
mischievous or absurd consequences. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Fresno County. Ernest Klette, Judge. Reversed with direc-
tions. 
Action to require an accounting to nonborrowing raISIn 
growers for amounts realized from disposition of surplus 
raisins delivered to a stabilization pool. Judgment for plain-
tiff reversed with directions. 
Francis M. Shea, Assistant Attorney General (U.S.), 
Charles H. Carr and Leo V. Silverstein, U. S. Attorneys, Ron-
[2] See 23 Ca1.Jur. 725; 50 Am.Jur. 200. 
[5] See 21 Ca1.Jur. 874; 23 Cal.Jur. 739; 43 Am.Jur. 69. 
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